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Abstract:
Information systems (IS) innovation in healthcare is a contested area often characterized by complex and conflicted
relationships among different stakeholders. In this paper, we provide a systematic understanding of the mechanisms
through which various actors translate competing visions about health sector reforms into policy and action and, thus,
generate contradictions in IS innovation. We argue that we can learn more about the source of such contradictions by
examining how competing frames can affect IS innovation in healthcare. We adopt frame theory and rhetorical
strategies analysis in the case of health sector reforms in Kenya and focus specifically on the deployment of health
information systems (HIS). We make several contributions. First, we demonstrate that policy actors’ adherence to the
interests and values represented in a frame is important in determining the choice of a rhetorical strategy and its
influence on policy transformation and IS innovation. Second, we develop an understanding of how technology
mediates the rhetorical strategies of different actors. In particular, we demonstrate the role of technology in giving
continuity to frames, which affects policy change and IS innovation.
Keywords: IS Innovation, Healthcare, Policy, Discourse Analysis, Frame Theory, Developing Countries.
Dubravka Cecez-Kecmanovic was the accepting senior editor. This paper was submitted on August 10, 2015 and went through two
revisions.
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Introduction

IS innovation in healthcare, which Swanson (1994) defines as the evolution of information technology
applications in the transformation of healthcare, is a contested area characterized by complex and
conflicted relationships among different stakeholders (Boonstra & Van Offenbeek, 2010; Cho &
Mathiassen, 2007; Constantinides & Barrett, 2006). The contested nature of IS innovation in the public
health sector lies in the contradictions brought about by governments’ policies and reforms.
Various scholars have demonstrated that health sector policies and the role that they assign to IT-enabled
transformations are constructed in discourse (Brown, 1998; Doolin, 2003; Klecun, 2015; Klecun-Dabrowska
& Cornford, 2000). Discourse influences how healthcare organizations implement IT systems and how such
systems affect healthcare transformation (Klecun, 2015). Key stakeholders reinterpret the main vision and
goals of policy documents, which affects how organizations translate policies into action and how such
policies produce impact (Mueller, Sillince, Harvey, & Howorth, 2004; Pope, Robert, Bate, Le May, & Gabbay,
2006). Controversies over IS innovations in the health sector arise when IS users and policymakers do not
share the same vision and expectations for health sector reforms that the policymakers set (Klecun, 2015;
Morrison, Marsden, Cresswell, Fernando, & Sheikh, 2013). These stakeholders constantly renegotiate the
purpose and meanings of IS innovations carried in policy documents and realign their interests with different
parties as necessary, which leads to different forms of resistance and workarounds (Cho, Mathiassen, &
Nilsson, 2008; Doolin, 2004; Payne & Leiter, 2013; Wainwright & Waring, 2007).
In addition, policymakers themselves often lack a common vision of how IT should transform the health
sector (Klecun-Dabrowska & Cornford, 2000; Morrison et al., 2013). For example, some may view costsavings from reducing hospital admissions as the main aim of remotely monitoring patients through
telehealth. Others may envisage adopting telehealth for providing enhanced community services and
improving patient care (Klecun-Dabrowska & Cornford, 2000).
Existing research acknowledges that the lack of a common vision in health sector policies can lead to
contradictions in the implementations and impact of IS innovations (Klecun-Dabrowska & Cornford 2000;
Morrison et al., 2013). Such contradictions manifest in different IS objectives, which, eventually, may
generate conflicting organizational outcomes, such as increased spending on patient-centered care as
opposed to efficiency gains. Yet, we lack understanding about how competing visions about health sector
reforms translate into policy and action and, thus, how they generate contradictions in IS innovation.
In this paper, we draw on frame theory and rhetorical strategy analysis to better understand how actors
shape and communicate their policy and vision on health sector reforms. “Frames” are socio-cognitive
structures through which we make sense of the world (Cornelissen & Werner, 2014). Thus, policymakers
use frames to make sense of problems and their solutions (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). In addition, actors
create and diffuse frames through rhetorical strategies, which they deploy to gain consensus about their
policy (Barrett, Heracleous, & Walsham, 2013).
Policies are strategic resources used to drive change and are often thought to exercise hegemonic
influence on societies and organizations (Brown, 2004). Our research stems from the assumption that
competing frames can challenge the hegemony of a dominant frame, which generates contradictions in IS
innovation. Actors question and transform policies not only as they formulate them but also as they
implement them (Motion & Leitch, 2009; Mueller et al., 2004). As actors debate policies when
implementing them, new and competing frames about health service innovation emerge (Pope et al.,
2006) and potentially replace the dominant frame, which influences policy transformation (Greener, 2004).
To explore the role of frames in policy transformation, we adopt frame theory and rhetorical strategy
analysis in a case study of health information systems in Kenya. The case study takes a historical
perspective to show how policy and organizational actors deploy rhetorical strategies to persuade others
about their own ideas of policy reforms and IS innovation in the health sector.
Our paper makes two contributions. First, we reveal the main rhetorical strategies that challenge the
hegemony of dominant frames and explain how such strategies can generate contradictions that have an
impact on IS innovation in healthcare (Currie, 2012; Currie & Guah, 2007; Klecun, 2015; KlecunDabrowska & Cornford, 2000; Morrison et al., 2013). In this way, we can learn more about the nature and
source of IS innovation contradictions, how they evolve, and their implications for the design and
implementation of IS innovation in healthcare. Second, we contribute to recent research about the role of
technologies in influencing policy and IT-enabled transformation (Constantinides, 2013; Doolin, 2003;

Volume 18

Issue 2

Journal of the Association for Information Systems

83

Klecun, 2011). Thus, we help explain how technology mediates rhetorical strategies that influence
changes in policy and the way IS innovations and possible contradictory outcomes unfold.
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in
influencing policy transformation. In Section 3, we propose frame theory to understand the political
function of rhetorical strategies and the role of technology in policy transformation and IS innovation in the
health sector. In Section 4, we describe our methodology and present a rhetorical strategy analysis of the
case study. Main findings and implications are then discussed followed by conclusions.

2

Rhetorical Strategies and Policy Transformation

Policies constitute a major strategic resource through which policymaking organizations drive change in
societal and economic systems, institutions, and organizations (Leitch & Davenport, 2005; Maguire &
Hardy, 2006; Motion & Leitch, 2009). Primarily, policymakers aim to impose a unique view of reality on
policy stakeholders and suppress differences in stakeholders’ own view of reality. Suppressing differences
is one way through which policymakers seek to protect a policy’s authority. Yet, because readers ascribe
authority to texts (Brown, Stacey, & Nandhakumar, 2008), policies do not have a fixed meaning: they are
subject to contestation and reinterpretation (Brown, 2004).
Thus, whereas policymaking institutions institute policies, the legitimacy of their “associated truth”
constitute the process by which stakeholder organizations may transform a policy (Motion & Leitch, 2009).
These organizations become authors of policies and deploy their own knowledge and power to negotiate
their meanings. A new policy’s legitimacy and the meaning and practice changes that it involves occurs
only after the organization successfully completes the negotiation process.
Stakeholder organizations can also negotiate and transform a policy’s meaning when implementing it. The
way these organizations connect and disconnect transformed meanings generates a policy-implementation
gap, which translates into differences in how they implement and adopt health service innovations (Pope et
al. 2006). As such, analyzing the linguistic turn in policymaking and implementation partially explains why
local actors do not meet policymakers’ expectations (Exworthy, Berney, & Powell, 2002).
One way in which organizational actors negotiate and transform policies is by deploying rhetorical
strategies. Rhetorical strategies are mechanisms through which individuals shape their understanding of
technologies, managerial practices, and, more generally, the organizational context in which they exist
(Brown, Ainsworth, & Grant, 2012; Heracleous & Barrett, 2001; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). In
particular, with the help of rhetorical strategies, actors may appropriate only a policy’s meanings that best
serve their own interests (Mueller et al., 2004).
In order to understand the influence of a policy on IS innovation in healthcare, one must consider the
extent to which a rhetorical strategy is just ceremonial or does effectively effect change (Alvesson &
Kärreman, 2011). A rhetorical strategy can have different functions that influence reality to a lesser or
greater degree (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011). We focus on understanding the effectiveness of rhetorical
strategies in influencing the meaning negotiation and legitimization of health sector policies and IS
innovation. To do so, we focus on frames—the cognitive structures that actors shape and manifest
through rhetorical strategies to make sense of and influence reality (Barrett et al., 2013).

2.1

Frames, Power, and Technology

Frames are socio-cognitive structures that we use to make sense of the world (Cornelissen & Werner,
2014). Through these socio-cognitive structures or frames, policymakers make sense of problems and
their possible solutions (van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). Frames used in policymaking may also include
“technology frames” (Orlikowski & Gash, 1994), which influence how policymakers make sense of an
information system and the way one should implement and use it to innovate the health service.
A key issue about IS innovation from a frame perspective concerns understanding how incongruent
frames evolve over time and what implications they and their changes have on innovation processes. For
example, researchers have understood shifts in frames as causing divergent patterns of, and conflict over,
IS development, implementations, and use (Azad & Faraj, 2008; Barrett et al., 2013; Constantinides &
Barrett, 2014; Davidson, 2006; Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). In particular, through rhetorical strategies,
actors may develop, diffuse, and legitimate a new frame about a technology (Barrett et al., 2013) and
policy issue (Jones & Exworthy, 2015) in or across their communities. Thus, rhetorical strategies can
produce change by influencing actors’ frames.
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Through rhetorical strategies, frames become means through which actors consolidate their power. We
perceive power as actors’ capability to transform and safeguard their interests by shaping meaning
through discourse (Avgerou & McGrath, 2007; Brown, 1998; Buchanan & Dawson, 2007; Currie & Brown,
2003). Thus, in analyzing rhetorical strategies, power relationships play a relevant role in influencing shifts
in frames (Jones & Exworthy, 2015). In particular, incongruent frames can reflect a reconfiguration of
interests and values, which alters the legitimacy and enactment of a policy (Pope et al., 2006). So, when it
comes to a rhetorical strategy’s political influence, one can see policymaking as an arena of political
contests where power exercises its influence by subtly shaping problems and their solutions.
By acknowledging the political function of rhetorical strategies, we also consider change as emerging from
the mutual relationship between discursive and non-discursive elements, such as institutions and political
interests (Alvesson & Kärreman, 2011). The focus on non-discursive elements allows one to acquire a
better understanding of the extent to which technology becomes embedded in policy and, simultaneously,
shapes its content. Related to this issue is how technology becomes implicated when actors construct
frames that represent a policy (Constantinides, 2013; Doolin, 2003; Klecun, 2011). On the one hand, local
actors construct frames that influence IS innovation according to their interests and values. On the other
hand, actors shape and diffuse frames not only through social interactions, such as human
communication, but also through material artifacts, such as texts and technologies (Doolin, 2003). This
perspective not only considers how frames and their rhetorical strategies can shape IS innovation (Barrett
et al., 2013) and the popularity of an IT concept that drives its diffusion (Wang, 2009); IS innovations and
the frames and rhetorical strategies that drive their diffusion can also influence how health service delivery
is conceived in policy and in action (Klecun, 2015; Mathar, 2011). In this way, existing technologies shape
and sustain key policy ideas and future innovations (Klecun, 2011; Raviola & Norbäck, 2013). An example
is how the information, rules, and resources embodied in information systems in healthcare provide
“concrete representations” (Doolin, 2003) of how accountability should be enacted (Doolin, 2004; Madon,
Krishna, & Michael, 2010; Noir & Walsham, 2007). Thus, information technology both constitutes and is
constituted by the frames actors draw on to construct their rhetorical strategies. In this way, information
technology can mediate how a policy becomes legitimized or contested.
As such, in this paper, we base our case study analysis on the concept of frames and rhetorical strategies
to identify different assumptions and expectations in health sector policies and their implications for IS
innovation in healthcare. We view rhetorical strategies as mechanisms that policy and organizational
actors use to shape and diffuse frames of how one should reform the health sector. We acknowledge the
political function of rhetorical strategies that actors deploy to pursue their own interests. We also consider
how technology mediates the rhetorical strategies that drive policy transformation. In Section 3, we
provide more detail about the type of rhetorical strategies considered in our case study.

3
3.1

Methodology
Research Context

The research is based on a historical analysis of the development of information systems in the public
healthcare sector in Kenya. The Kenyan context suits the purpose of our study since, like in many other
developing countries, health information systems in Kenya have been the target of institutional reforms
meant to improve the planning and management capacity of the health sector for more than 30 years
(Odhiambo-Otieno, 2005). These reforms seek to, among other things, integrate health information systems
(Kimaro & Sahay, 2007; Saltman, Bankauskaite, & Vrangbaek, 2007) to provide decision makers across all
levels of the health sector (hospital managers, district health managers, senior health policy managers) with
timely and accurate health data to better deliver health services (Chilundo & Aanestad, 2004; Madon et al.,
2010; Smith, Madon, Anifalaie, Lazarro-Malacela, & Michael, 2008). Yet, available studies show that the
integration of health information systems has been unsuccessful in many developing countries (Kimaro &
Sahay, 2007; Odhiambo-Otieno, 2005) where national governments and donor agencies still use fragmented
health information systems to monitor and account for performance and health spending (Madon et al.,
2010; Mekonnen & Sahay, 2008; Noir & Walsham, 2007). Thus, given the historical perspective we adopt,
the case study in Kenya constitutes an ideal setting to analyze how, over time, incongruent frames and
competing rhetorical strategies influenced the integration of health information systems as part of the effort to
innovate development interventions in the health sector in Kenya.
In addition, given the importance of power in rhetorical strategies, the case study in Kenya represents an
ideal setting due to the presence of a variety of actors standing at different relational and power positions.
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Hence, like in many other developing countries, global managerialist reforms driving health service
innovation are subject to continuous international political pressures (Hayes & Rajao, 2011; Rajao &
Hayes, 2009). In such a context, understanding how competing frames and their rhetorical strategies
influence policy formulation and implementation acquires even more significance.

3.2

Data Collection

We collected data from interviews and documents between 2007 and 2011. We conducted 47 interviews
as we show in Table 1.
Table 1. List of Interviews
Organization/department

Number of informants

Two multilateral donor agencies

3

Three bilateral donor agencies

3

Senior government officers

4

HMIS (Kenya’s Ministry of Health)

12

Immunization program (Kenya’s Ministry of Health)

11

HIV/AIDS program (Kenya’s Ministry of Health)

14

Total

47

In Kenya’s Ministry of Health, the sample of informants included health records information officers and
medical officials of three main organizational units: the Division of Health Management Information
Systems (HMIS) and two national health programs on immunization and on HIV/AIDS, respectively. The
Division of HMIS was part of the national strategy of integrating Kenya’s health information systems under
a unique system. The two national programs constitute two examples of vertical health information
systems in the country.
We selected informants from the Ministry of Health and the Government of Kenya based on the relevance
of their role in relation to health sector reforms and the restructuring of health information systems in
Kenya. Whenever possible, we also selected participants based on their date of deployment given the
importance of gathering historical accounts to trace relevant narratives. We also interviewed six
informants from international donor agencies to gain the perspective of the main international actors
involved in implementing health sector reforms and health information systems in Kenya.
We used primary data from interviews to recollect past and more recent accounts of the health information
system. In addition to interviews, a sample of approximately 6,000 pages of documents we took from the
archives of Kenya’s Ministry of Health represents a key resource for this study. These documents included
government policy documents, minutes of meetings, letters, and reports from the information systems that
covered from 1977 to 2008. We also collected relevant international agencies’ policy and project
documents available from the Internet. With respect to the interviews, documents were a valuable
historical source of information for tracing past events and practices that the memory of informants could
not recall. In particular, documentary resources were fundamental to identifying the core rhetorical
strategies that have shaped health sector policies and IS innovation in Kenya in the past 40 years.

3.3

Data Analysis

We used rhetorical strategy analysis to understand how actors have created, revisited, and modified
frames in policy that influence IS innovation in healthcare. We first read through our interview transcripts
and document extracts several times to build a chronology of significant events that “speak about”
relevant themes such as aid effectiveness, accountability, and so on because “Chronology is the starting
point of the narrative building of a plot that feeds the sensemaking process” (Boudes & Laroche, 2009, p.
383). Based on the presupposition that “texts are elements of social events; they bring about change”
(Fairclough, 2003), we pieced together a chronology of events by relating each event to key texts
including both documents and interview transcripts.
At this stage, we could identify key frames representing healthcare policies. For example, the frames of
“health as a human right” or “social justice” represented primary healthcare, whereas “cost-effectiveness”
and “accountability” constituted the policy of selective primary healthcare.
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Hence, we next focused on rhetorical strategies as mechanisms through which actors seek to gain
consensus over what makes sense to them. Drawing on Fairclough’s (2003, pp. 41-42) typology, we focused
on five rhetorical strategies as Table 2 illustrates. In Fairclough’s words, one can use these strategies to
understand how actors interpret and negotiate differences in meaning. For example, openness to difference
(a) assumes one’s effort to understand and accept differences. When one accentuates conflict through
polemic (b), the acceptance of differences of power may prevail leading to consensus through the
suppression of meanings (e). Rhetorical strategies (c) resolution and (d) bracketing of differences relate to a
less conflictual and softer way of dealing with differences. In both rhetorical strategies prevails the mutual
understanding that differences in meanings and values may coexist. For example, two actors may overcome
differences (c) by proposing alternative points of view or solutions that mediate between opposite meanings.
Alternatively, they may set aside differences and decide to focus on commonalities only (d). The case study
analysis that follows revealed four of the five strategies illustrated in Table 2: polemic (b), resolution (c),
bracketing (d), and normalization (e). In analyzing these strategies, we paid particular attention on the role of
unbalanced power relations and misalignment and realignment of interests among different actors
(Constantinides & Barrett, 2006; Doolin, 2004).
Table 2. Rhetorical Strategies*
a) openness: accepting and recognizing difference.
b) polemic: accentuating difference and conflict over meaning, norms, and power.
c) resolution: an attempt to resolve or overcome difference.
d) bracketing: a bracketing of difference; a focus on commonality, solidarity.
e) normalization: a consensus and acceptance of differences of power that suppresses differences of meaning and
norms.
* Adapted from Fairclough’s scenarios (2003, pp. 41-42).

4

Case Study and Analysis

The case that follows focuses on the main rhetorical strategies that policy actors used to create, re-create, and
challenge three key policies in international health: primary healthcare (1970-1978), selective primary healthcare
(1979-1994), sector-wide approaches (SWAps) (1994-2011). The case study shows how the translation of
international policies and their frames influenced health information systems in Kenya in five phases. In addition to
the summary tables at the end of each phase, we provide more detail on how we identified frames and their
respective rhetorical strategies from interviews and policy documents in the appendix.

4.1

Phase 1: the Creation of Primary Healthcare (PHC) in the International Health
Arena (1970-1978)

The failure of the global malaria eradication program in the 1960s prompted the World Health
Organization (WHO) and members of the scientific community to deploy a polemic rhetorical strategy.
Through this rhetorical strategy, they dismissed old models of delivering healthcare, such as vertical
control programs. Instead, they acknowledged that strengthening health infrastructures in developing
countries would be a more adequate approach to malaria control (Bennett, 1979; Brown, Cueto, & Fee,
2006). Based on new socio-economic theories of development and the views of human rights movements,
they argued that a new approach, primary healthcare (PHC), could support the integration of communitybased health services (Brown, Cueto, & Fee, 2006; Gish, 1982).
Starting with a study of community-based rural health services carried out in 1971, subsequent policy and
scientific texts molded the PHC concept over the principles that health is “a fundamental human right” and
its attainability by all a matter of “social justice” (WHO 1978). Primary healthcare promoted “equity of
distribution of health care” (Bennett 1979, p. 505) by focusing on the “basic health needs” of a community
within “existing resource constraints” (Gish 1982, p. 1050).
The international community legitimized PHC at the Alma-Ata Conference, where, in 1978, 134 nations
adopted the Declaration of Primary Health Care (Brown et al. 2006). The Declaration set the goal of
“Health for all in the Year 2000” and promoted an “intersectoral” and systemic approach to “health care
and health education” in developing countries (Brown et al. 2006; WHO 1978). Table 3 summarizes the
key findings for this period.
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Table 3. Phase 1: The Creation of PHC in the International Health Arena (1970-1978)
Authors
Rhetorical strategies

Frames
Technology
Outcomes

4.2

World Health Organization
Polemic rhetorical strategy to legitimize the strengthening of health infrastructures through
PHC
Vertical control programs, such as malaria eradication, cannot deliver desired results.
Integrating healthcare in community-based services.
Health is “a fundamental human right” and a matter of “social justice”.
PHC promotes “equity of distribution of health care”.
International community endorsed PHC in the “Alma-Ata Declaration” (WHO, 1978)

Phase 2: the Creation of Selective Primary Healthcare (SPHC) as a Substitute of
PHC in the International Health Arena (1979-1980)

An alternative approach proposed by major international organizations such as the World Bank and
UNICEF at the Bellagio Conference in 1979—selective primary healthcare (SPHC)—soon challenged
PHC. Through a polemic rhetorical strategy, these organizations used Walsh and Warren’s (1979) work to
delegitimize PHC (Cueto, 2004) as being “unrealistic” and “unattainable” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 67). By
contrast, they considered SPHC as a better approach to achieve “cost-effectiveness” and rapid “tangible
results” through vertical health programs (Tejada de Rivero, 2003; Walsh & Warren, 1980).
These organizations came to a consensus over the concept of cost-effectiveness that underpinned SPHC
through a rhetorical strategy of normalization, which suppressed the difference between “comprehensive”
and “selective” to the extent that SPHC became the only possible solution in the resource-deprived
context of most developing countries (Walsh & Warren, 1979):
Since it must be acknowledged that resources available for health programs are usually limited,
the provision of total primary health care to everyone in the near future remains unlikely…
services targeted to the few most important diseases may be the most effective means of
improving the health of the greatest number of people. (Walsh and Warren 1980, p. 148)
Major donor agencies approved SPHC because it legitimized institutionalized models of international
aid such a short-term development programs as the only option to attain rapid results in health
interventions (Brown et al., 2006; Gish, 1982; Walsh & Warren, 1979). One can read this message in
the words attributed to the executive director of UNICEF, James Grant, at the time: “Grant believed
that international agencies had to do their best with finite resources and shortlived local political
opportunities. This meant translating general goals into time-bound specific actions” (Cueto, 2004, p.
1869). Thus, major international organizations’ rhetorical strategy successfully gained widespread
support for SPHC as demonstrated by the implementation of selective interventions such as the GOBI
program (Cueto, 2004). GOBI comprised four interventions: growth monitoring, oral rehydration,
breastfeeding, immunization. According to UNICEF and other major donor agencies such as the World
Bank, monitoring indicators constituted an essential toolkit to measure GOBI targets and achieve rapid
results: “[GOBI] appeared easy to monitor and evaluate. Moreover, [its interventions] were measurable
and had clear targets. Funding appeared easier to obtain because indicators of success and reporting
could be produced more rapidly” (Cueto, 2004, p. 1869). Thus, “monitoring indicators” helped to
demonstrate how selective interventions can be easy to measure and able to produce rapid results—
one of the SPHC policy’s key frames.
On the one hand, the core principles of SPHC sparked a lot of criticism among the main supporters of the
original concept of primary healthcare. Kenneth W. Newell, one of the architects of primary healthcare,
noted: “[selective primary health care] is a threat... Its attractions to the professionals and to funding
agencies and governments looking for short-term goals are very apparent” (Newell, 1988, cited in Cueto,
2004, p. 1971). On the other hand, the supporters of SPHC criticized the lack of clear targets in PHC. To
reconcile these opposite views and garner support for PHC, the WHO reviewed the PHC policy through a
rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences; in a paper entitled “Indicators for Monitoring Progress
Towards Health for All”, the WHO proposed using indicators to monitor the implementation of “health for
all” strategies and plans, all concepts that PHC opponents commonly accepted (Brown et al., 2006).
Monitoring indicators helped to demonstrate how one could use measurable targets to gauge health
interventions progress as spelled out in the SPHC policy. Thus, monitoring indicators were at the heart of
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the rhetorical strategy that the WHO deployed to create commonalities between PHC and SPHC. This
example shows how an IS innovation, such as using indicators in monitoring and planning health
interventions, can shape health sector policies (Klecun, 2015; Mathar, 2011).
An attentive analysis of the “health for all” strategy of 1979 unveiled a set of “technology frames”
(Orlikowski & Gash, 1994). Through these frames, the WHO re-interpreted the design and use of health
information system (HIS) monitoring indicators with a focus on community healthcare needs as advocated
in PHC. The strategy recommended “developing locally suitable indicators” and using “sampling” to avoid
“overloading health workers with routine data collection”, “inaccurate reporting”, and “unused information”
(World Health Organization, 1979). Against the top-down approach of disease control programs, the
strategy proposed a bottom-up approach to monitor indicators to make them “manageable” and
“meaningful” for the local populations (World Health Organization, 1979, p. 30).
By adhering to SPHC principles, international organizations such as UNICEF acquired legitimacy and
access to donor funding, whereas the WHO lost its dominant position in international health to the
advantage of the World Bank (Brown et al., 2006; Silver, 1998). Table 4 summarizes our key findings.
Table 4. Phase 2: The Creation of SPHC as a Substitute of PHC in the International Health Arena (1979-1980)
Authors

World Bank and major international organizations World Health Organization

Polemic rhetorical
Rhetorical strategy to
strategies delegitimize PHC and
legitimize SPHC.

Rhetorical strategy of
normalization to suppress
differences between
Rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences to
comprehensive and
review PHC and create commonalities with SPHC.
selective care and replace
PHC with SPHC.

PHC is unrealistic
and unattainable.
Frames

Cannot sustain
“comprehensive” PHC in
resource-deprived context
Vertical health
of most developing
programs can deliver countries.
“cost-effectiveness”
and rapid “tangible
SPHC is the only possible
results”.
solution.

Monitoring indicators helped to demonstrate how
“selective interventions can be easy to measure
Technology
and able to produce rapid results” (an SPHC
frame).
Outcomes

4.3

Indicators should be used to monitor the “Health
for All” strategy.
Monitoring indicators should be “manageable” and
“meaningful” for local populations.
One should use “sampling” to avoid “overloading
health workers with routine data collection”,
“inaccurate reporting”, and “unused information”.
Monitoring indicators helped to demonstrate how
one can use “measurable targets…to gauge health
interventions progress” (an SPHC frame).

Major international organizations legitimized SPHC.
SPHC contributed to spreading vertical health interventions and IS (e.g., GOBI).

Phase 3: Contestation between PHC and SPHC in Kenya (1980-1994)

In the 1980s, the WHO was committed to integrating multiple health projects and information systems created
by donor organizations under unique programs. In this strategy, the WHO promoted the establishment of
Kenya’s national program of immunization in 1980 and the creation of Kenya’s national program of HIV/AIDS
between 1987 and 1990. The WHO justified the creation of both programs through a rhetorical strategy of
bracketing differences similar to that employed to gain opponents’ support to PHC. This rhetorical strategy
shared commonalities with SPHC by legitimizing managerial practices, including using information for planning
and monitoring programs activities. In particular, epidemiological and surveillance systems constituted the
SPHC’s frame that legitimized the production of “managerial data to measure program performance and
results”. The 1990 plan of the national HIV/AIDS program notes: “Epidemiology and surveillance will…
generate managerial data to measure… program performance and results” (NASCOP, 1990).
At the same time, the WHO’s rhetorical strategy challenged the SPHC idea of short-term, ad-hoc health
interventions by putting forward principles and concepts that were more in line with the comprehensive
care values of PHC. Such principles and concepts included integrating such interventions as immunization
(Atun, Bennett, & Duran, 2008; World Health Organization, 1974) and the prevention of sexually
transmitted diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, into Kenya’s national and rural health systems as noted in the
1990 plan of the national HIV/AIDS program: “The Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) Control Program
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will not be a vertical program but will be decentralized and integrated with other programs based on…
PHC principles…” (NASCOP, 1990).
National health programs became an umbrella under which various donor agencies funded targeted
health interventions, which also led to the establishment of national program information systems. For
example, in 1989, the WHO supported the installation of a computerized EPI information system (CEIS),
which the national immunization program used to analyze vaccines data that field workers collected
through dedicated reporting forms (e.g. MOH702/710). A few years later, the World Bank supported
setting up an HIV/AIDS sentinel surveillance system (World Bank, 2002). The national HIV/AIDS program
gained data under this system from a national blood donor HIV surveillance form (MOH723)—used by
blood screening centers to report on test results—and the national AIDS register (MOH345)—used by
surveillance sites to report AIDS cases.
Hence, instead of setting up their own information systems, donor agencies relied on national programs’
information systems to monitor health indicators and account for their funding. For example, in the first
half of the 1990s in the immunization sector, various donor agencies were interested in using information
systems to account for vaccines supply and to plan and monitor ad-hoc initiatives such as polio
immunization campaigns (Brown et al., 2006). An officer of the immunization program explained as much
during an interview: “When we started the first national immunization day campaign for polio in 1996, we
had to use a lot of this information to do the planning for the districts”. Yet, the lack of integration across
national programs’ information systems overburdened health workers at the health facilities with datacollection duties to the extent that they could not efficiently report the data they were supposed to collect
(Odhiambo-Otieno, 2005). Table 5 summarizes the main findings of this period.
Table 5. Phase 3: Contestation between SPHC and PHC in Kenya (1980-1994)
Authors
Rhetorical Strategies

World Health Organization
Rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences to appropriate elements of SPHC while
keeping some of the principles of PHC.
“Generate managerial data to measure…program performance and results”.

Frames

Technology

Integrate health interventions into national and rural systems in line with comprehensive
care values of PHC.
Epidemiological and surveillance systems constituted the SPHC’s frame that legitimized the
production of “managerial data to measure program performance and results”. .
Standalone IS integrated under health programs.

Outcomes

4.4

Lack of integration across national programs’ information systems overburdened health
workers at the health facilities with data-collection duties.

Phase 4: National Policy of Integrating HIS and Translating International
Sector-wide Approaches (SWAps) into Kenya (1994-2000)

In 1994, Kenya’s Ministry of Health adopted the “National Health Policy” that endorsed some of the SPHC
principles. Following the recommendations of the World Bank’s report “Investing in Health” published in
1993, the policy envisaged introducing “essential health packages” that involved identifying the most costeffective health interventions (Segall, 2003). Yet, in opposition to the SPHC frames that legitimized ad-hoc
health interventions for rapid results, the new policy supported integrated health information systems to
improve performance monitoring and financial accountability (Ministry of Health, 1994; Ministry of Health,
1996). Kenya’s national HIS department confirmed that a lack of integrated HIS constrained its ability to
provide health planning and management information to the ministry’s officials (HIS, 1991; HIS, 2000b). In
various meetings, the department complained that its officers were delayed in performing their duties since
they had to repeatedly ask for data about the various health programs such as family planning and
immunization (HIS, 1992). Reiterating “the need for accurate and timely information… for decision making
and proper planning”, during one meeting, the deputy chief economist of the department of planning raised
serious concerns about the poor performance of the national health information system (HIS, 2000a).
Thus, the technology constraints of fragmented health information systems contributed to making Kenya’s
Ministry of Health realize that accounting for results, as originally spelled out in SPHC, could not work
without integration. Thus, such technology constraints were a key factor that led to the creation of the new
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frame that legitimized integrating HIS for better performance monitoring and accountability. More
specifically, in formulating the new policy, the ministry adopted a rhetorical strategy of resolving
differences that reflected the need to integrate and strengthen “key health management information
systems to support the policy making role of the Ministry of Health in disease surveillance, planning,
monitoring and evaluation” (Ministry of Health, 1994, p. 47).
After the Ministry of Health implemented this new policy, it turned the Department of HIS into the Division
of Health Management Information Systems (HMIS) and put HMIS in charge of integrating HIS and
monitoring the health sector’s performance. The new policy of integration envisaged that all information
collected at district level would be sent to HMIS at the national level. HMIS was then in charge of
supplying health programs with relevant information. Figure 1 illustrates the vertical and centralized HIS
on the left-hand side and the planned integrated HIS in Kenya on the right-hand side.

Figure 1. Vertical and Centralized HIS (on the Left-hand Side) vs. Planned Integrated HIS in Kenya (on the
Right-hand Side)

The new policy led to a series of changes in the HIS, which included HMIS’s designing and testing a new
data-reporting form (MOH711) that integrated information from reproductive health, HIV/AIDS,
Tuberculosis, Malaria, and child nutrition IS. With the introduction of this new form, the Division of HMIS
hoped to reduce the data-entry workload of health facilities (Ministry of Health, 2008). In addition, it
equipped a considerable number of districts with computers and file transfer protocol (FTP) tools to
accelerate data transfer to the national level.
Thus, the Ministry of Health’s rhetorical strategy that shaped the health sector policy in Kenya reflects only
partially the original SPHC approach. Such a rhetorical strategy carried new concepts of costeffectiveness that legitimized ad-hoc and vertical health interventions. It still gave importance to
performance monitoring and accountability, but, this time, to support integrated health information systems
for more effective health sector planning and management.
In the second half of the 1990s, under the leadership of the World Bank, the international community
agreed to support the sector-wide approaches (SWAps) (Ruger, 2005). SWAps were shaped through a
rhetorical strategy of resolving differences meant to respond to critiques against the World Bank’s lending
policies and practices in providing international aid (World Bank, 1992, as cited in Jones, 2000). In
particular, SWAps were meant to overcome the limitations of the donor-driven fragmentation of vertical
programs in most developing countries. For this purpose, SWAps supported a holistic approach to health
sector interventions by pooling donor and government funding into a common health budget (Cassel,
1997). SWAps envisaged integrating health sector interventions under the principle of “aid effectiveness”
(Jones, 2000). This new policy had little to share with PHC’s legitimizing the integration of communitybased health services in the late 1970s. Instead, aid effectiveness became a rhetorical device that
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legitimized central monitoring systems as fundamental for tracking funding and results (Cassel, 1997; Hill,
2002; Lambo & Sambo, 2003; World Bank, 1993).
While negotiating SWAps’ international agreements, donor agencies enacted a polemic rhetorical
strategy. Through this rhetorical strategy, they established that governments of developing countries
needed sound management, monitoring capacity, and accountability to qualify for budget support (Cassel,
1997; Lambo & Sambo, 2003). Thus, instead of committing to budget support and the integration of health
sector interventions, most donor agencies preferred to maintain separate funding channels and monitoring
systems. They focused on protecting their interests from what they perceived as a lack of financial
capacity and accountability by national governments. In Kenya, one donor agency experienced [a
situation in which it considered budget support as too risky. Indeed, one representative from this donor
agency said: “Our decision has always been not to contribute money directly into Kenya’s healthcare
budget since its financial systems are not robust enough”. Official documents from the World Bank
confirmed that the Kenyan Government maintained a certain degree of resistance to accountability. For
example, technical assistance documents of the World Bank highlight the government’s lack of
commitment to implementing an integrated financial management system (World Bank, 2004).
Notwithstanding the government’s effort to set up performance management and monitoring systems,
these findings suggest that the government’s institutions were still not fully committed to accountability.
Many donor agencies interpreted poor accountability as a form of resistance to health sector reforms,
which restrained them from fully committing to coordinating aid and integrating health information
systems. Official reports from HMIS confirmed how disjointed data-management procedures and practices
embedded in vertical health information systems had not been resolved yet (Ministry of Health, 2006). At
the same time, a lack of coordination between different donor partners was still a problem; one donor
agency consultant said: “[Most of the time the Global Fund, The Global Alliance for Vaccines and
Immunizations (GAVI), HMIS, and so on…are even trying to achieve the same objectives, but they are not
talking to each other in a structured manner”. Table 6 summarizes the key findings for this period.

4.5

Phase 5: Incongruent Frames of Integration in Kenya (2000-2011)

Kenya’s HIV/AIDS sector in particular felt the pressure to coordinate aid and harmonize monitoring and
evaluation as one donor representative explained: “When I started working in Kenya [in 1999]…, the
Government, [the HIV/AIDS program], and all the donors… offered a strategy… to work jointly on monitoring
and evaluation because everyone was monitoring and evaluating their own project with their own finance”.
To harmonize HIV/AIDS interventions in Kenya, the World Bank and other U.N. organizations supported the
creation of the National HIV/AIDS Control Council (NACC) in 2000 and the National HIV/AIDS Monitoring
and Evaluation (M&E) Framework in 2005. NACC’s mission included: “Coordinat[ing] and superviz[ing] [the]
implementation of AIDS programs through a multisectoral, multidisciplinary approach…, mobiliz[ing]
government ministries and institutions, NGOs, etc. to participate in AIDS control…, [and] developing
management information systems for AIDS control” (Government of Kenya, 1997).
The World Bank led the creation of NACC through the rhetorical strategy of resolving differences similar to
that used in generating the SWAps. This rhetorical strategy included frames of integrated and coordinated
action spelled out in SWAps. The strategy’s aim focused on reducing the fragmentation of HIV/AIDS
interventions and increasing aid effectiveness (NACC, 2009). Under the influence of this rhetorical strategy,
the Government of Kenya conceived the coordination and integration of HIV/AIDS programs as a
“multisectoral approach” (Government of Kenya, 1997). Paradoxically, the multisectoral approach
contradicted the sector-wide approaches. As such, NACC became a system on its own that collected
information from all HIV/AIDS policy stakeholders but was not integrated with other information systems in
the health sector. Hence, multisectoral HIV/AIDS policies further fragmented the HIS in the country. For
example, Kenya’s national HIV/AIDS program’s information system collected data from all healthcare
providers for the National Monitoring and Evaluation Framework. Besides the national HIV/AIDS program’s
information system, the framework collected data from other sources such as NACC’s community-based
program activity reporting (COBPAR) for data generated by local volunteering organizations. NACC would
then input data received from all sources into the Country Response Information System (CRIS).
NACC also faced criticism that it was not properly fulfilling its coordinating responsibilities because it was
too busy implementing the World Bank’s HIV/AIDS project. The perception was that the World Bank
created NACC to gain more political control over HIV/AIDS interventions. Indeed, an international
organization officer said: “The reason why you have multiple AIDS control programs is that donors wanted
to have more control over how the money was spent in that particular area. So they created new
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institutions of management…[and] more fragmentation and duplication”. Thus, donors’ desire to secure
political control over funded activities drove the lack of integration between various HIV/AIDS programs
and their respective information systems. As a result, the national HIV/AIDS program became more
accountable to NACC and other international donor organizations than to the Ministry of Health’s central
HMIS. In this regard, one information officer working for the national program of HIV/AIDS explained:
“[The national program of HIV/AIDS] has to report to NACC… UNAIDS… WHO, and even for further
funding they need to keep the partners abreast of what is happening”. Hence, incongruent frames about
the definition and conditions of integrating international health interventions challenged the harmonization
of health information systems and undermined aid effectiveness.
A further challenge to SWAps came from national programs that considered accountability as a source of
opportunity to raise donor funding. For example, one information officer working for the national HIV/AIDS
program said: “In the beginning we really did not have many [donor] partners on board, but gradually they
are coming in…and demand for information has really gone up. Everybody is [now] very sensitive [about
the need for information] to solicit funds”. The national HIV/AIDS program’s information officers enacted a
rhetorical strategy of normalization to enforce accountability on health workers who collected data at
health facilities. The officers used a rhetorical strategy in which they persuaded the health workers that
they needed to “document” drug expenditure to access funding and carry on their activities. One of these
officers said: “Issues of documentation have been problems among health workers… [We tell] them: ‘I
wouldn’t give you drugs before you tell me what you spent on drugs…. [You can use reported data
to]…replenish whatever stock you need.”.
Thus, the national HIV/AIDS program’s information officers drew on HIS outputs, such as data reports that
“documented” results, in their rhetorical strategy to demonstrate how field workers should use the HIS to
account for results. In this way, they gave continuity to the accountability frame. The normalization of
accountability contributed to the strong centralization of program information systems. As a result, local
health managers did not value using information to improve health service management and delivery in
their communities. Table 7 summarizes these findings.
In summary, in spite of a series of international and national reforms that affected the health sector in
Kenya for almost 40 years, by 2011, the country’s HIS showed little change. Apart from small
technological improvements, the HIS was still fragmented and being used as a centralized data-reporting
tool. Only in recent years has Kenya begun to work with its international partners to decentralize the HIS
in an attempt to increase the local ownership of information. In this paper, we focus on how policy
transformation affected HIS innovation in the years that preceded decentralization. Table 8 summarizes
the key phases, actors, actions, and outcome we derived from analyzing the case study.
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Table 6. Phase 4: National Policy of Integrating HIS and Translating International SWAps into Kenya (19942000)
World Bank and international
community

Kenya’s Ministry of Health

Authors

Rhetorical strategy of resolving
differences to integrate and
strengthen HIS in support for
“disease surveillance, planning,
monitoring and evaluation”.

Rhetorical
strategies

Integrated HIS can improve
performance monitoring and
accountability.

Frames

Rhetorical strategy of resolving
differences to overcome the
limitations of donor-driven
fragmentation of vertical
programs.
Integrate health sector
interventions through budget
support to achieve aid
effectiveness.
Central monitoring systems are
fundamental for tracking funding
and results.

Technology constraints of
fragmented HIS contribute to the
realization that accounting for
results cannot work without
Technology integration, thus, leading to the
creation of the new frame that
legitimizes integrating HIS for
better performance monitoring
and accountability.
Outcomes

Major donor agencies
Polemic rhetorical strategy to
protect donor interests from lack
of financial capacity and
accountability of national
governments.

Sound program management,
monitoring capacity, and
accountability are essential to
qualify for budget support.

-

Limitations to budget support and aid effectiveness undermined efforts to integrate HIS.

Table 7. Phase 5: Incongruent Frames of Integration in Kenya (2000-2011)
Authors
Rhetorical
strategies

World Bank and international community

Information officers at the national HIV/AIDS
program

Rhetorical strategy of resolving differences to
reduce the fragmentation of HIV/AIDS
interventions and increase aid effectiveness.

Rhetorical strategy of normalization to enforce
accountability on health workers who collect data at
health facilities.

“Multisectoral approach” to the coordination and “Documenting” individuals’ drug expenditure is vital
integration of HIV/AIDS programs and M&E
to access funding.

Frames

Technology

-

Information officers draw on HIS outputs, such as
data reports “documenting” results, to demonstrate
how field workers should use the HIS to account for
results and give continuity to the accountability
frame.

Multisectoral HIV/AIDS coordination contradicted SWAps.
Outcomes

Multiple monitoring systems exacerbated contradictions with integrating HIS under SWAps.
Centralized HIS undermined local health managers’ use of information.
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Table 8. Summary of Phases, Actors, Actions, and Outcomes of Policy Transformation in Kenya
Phases
Creation of primary
healthcare (PHC)
(1970-1978)
Selective primary
healthcare (SPHC)
substitutes PHC
(1979-1980)

Contestation
between SPHC and
PHC (1980-1994)

Actors
World Health
Organization

Create the PHC approach to
integrated health interventions.

World Bank and
other major
international
agencies

Delegitimize PHC to replace it with
SPHC.

World Health
Organization

World Health
Organization

Kenya’s Ministry
of Health

National HISintegration policy and
World Bank and
International sectorinternational
wide approaches
community
(SWAps) (19942000)
Major donor
agencies
World Bank and
international
community
Incongruent frames
of integration (20002011)

5

Actions

Information
officers at the
national
HIV/AIDS
program

Outcomes
International community endorsed
PHC in 1978.
Most international agencies adhered
to SPHC.

SPHC contributed to spreading
Reconcile PHC with SPHC by
vertical fragmented health
appropriating some SPHC frames and
interventions and IS.
legitimizing monitoring indicators.
Draw on PHC to integrate health
projects under national programs.
Enact SPHC by supporting HIS for
monitoring performance.

Standalone IS were integrated
under health programs
Health programs IS were not
integrated, which overburdened
health workers with data-collection
duties.

Advocate for integrated HIS to
effectively monitor performance.
Lead the adoption of SWAps to
improve aid effectiveness.

Health interventions and IS
integration was unsuccessful.

Prioritize accountability over aid
effectiveness, which undermines
budget support and health
interventiosn integration.
Support multisectoral HIV/AIDS
coordination and M&E to achieve aid
effectiveness.
Advocate for using HIS for vertical
reporting and accountability.

Multisectoral HIV/AIDS coordination
contradicted SWAps.

Multiple monitoring systems
contradicted IS integration and
undermined local health managers’
use of information.

Discussion and Implications

Large-scale ICT innovation programs arise from interdependencies between the macro policy level and the
micro implementation level (Greenhalgh & Stones, 2010; Pope et al., 2006). The rhetorical strategies analysis
we adopt in this study clarifies the mechanisms through which policymaking and enactment intertwine. In
particular, we help explain the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in influencing IS innovation in healthcare.
Our analysis shows how some rhetorical strategies (e.g., normalization and polemic strategies) that
powerful actors influence are more likely to set in place dominant frames with hegemonic influence. For
example, as the second phase of the case study shows (see Table 4 for a summary), major international
donor agencies displaced PHC with rhetorical strategies of normalization and polemic. In addition, the
national HIV/AIDS program’s information officers extended the hegemonic influence of the dominant
frame of accountability by adopting a rhetorical strategy of normalization (see phase 5 summarized in
Table 7). Thus, rhetorical strategies constitute an instrument of power (Barrett et al., 2013; Bartis & Mitev,
2008; Jones & Exworthy, 2015), which international policy actors can exercise also with the help of less
powerful actors at the local level.
We also reveal how the voice of the less powerful (Boje, 2001) can challenge the hegemony of dominant
frames. In various instances, less powerful actors enacted less confrontational rhetorical strategies. For
example, the WHO enacted the rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences to compromise between PHC
and SPHC (see Tables 4 and 5, which summarize phases 2 and 3, respectively). In phase 4, the Ministry
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of Health enacted the rhetorical strategy of resolving differences to support efforts to integrate HIS and
revert the fragmentation of HIS (see summary in Table 6). The rhetorical strategies enacted by less
powerful actors eroded the hegemony of dominant frames at different levels of effectiveness and,
therefore, had different effects on possible contradictions in IS innovation. In the discussion that follows,
we link the choice and effect of a rhetorical strategy to the set of interests and values on which policy
actors construct frames. In particular, we argue that a lack of coherence in the interests and values that
underlie competing frames can generate further contradictions in IS innovation. Indeed, in the case study,
the World Bank supported two distinct policies based on the same principle of aid effectiveness but did so
to achieve different interests (see Tables 6 and 7, which summarize phases 4 and 5, respectively).
In addition, our findings complement existing research on technology’s role in influencing policy and
innovation (Constantinides, 2013; Doolin, 2003; Klecun, 2011) by demonstrating how technology
contributes to shaping frames inherent in rhetorical strategies. In Section 5.3, we illustrate how elements
of health information systems, such as monitoring indicators, both constitute and are constituted by
frames that actors draw on to construct their rhetorical strategies and legitimize the use of HIS. Below, we
discuss our findings (which Table 9 summarizes) in more detail.
Table 9. Frames and Rhetorical Strategies in the Transformation of Policy and IS Innovation
SPHC replaces PHC

PHC vs. hegemony of
SPHC

New policy for
integrating HIS and
SWAps

Accountability vs.
SWAps and
integration

Polemic and
normalization

Bracketing

Resolution

Polemic and
normalization

Rhetorical
strategies

Technology

Monitoring indicators
help to demonstrate
how “selective
interventions can be
easy to measure and
able to produce rapid
results” (an SPHC
frame).

Technology constraints
contribute to the
Monitoring tools help to realization that “HIS
demonstrate how to
integration is needed
use data to measure
for performance
results (an SPHC
monitoring and
frame).
accountability”, a frame
of the new policy for
integrating HIS.

Data reports that
“document” results are
drawn on to
demonstrate how field
workers should use the
HIS to account for
results.

Policy
supporters’
adherence to
interests and
values that
underpin frames

Strong adherence to
interests and values
represented in SPHC
frames.

Weak adherence to
Strong adherence to
interests and values
some SPHC principles
represented in the
and core principles of
accountability and aid
PHC.
effectiveness frames.

Strong adherence to
interests represented in
the accountability
frame.

Effectiveness of
SPHC delegitimizes
rhetorical
and replaces PHC.
strategies

IS innovation
outcomes and
contradictions

5.1

PHC mitigates
hegemony of SPHC.

Standalone IS
Diffusion of fragmented
integration under
HIS.
national programs.

Reduced effectiveness
of competing frames
(HIS integration and
SWAps).

Dominant frame of
accountability limits
diffusion of competing
frames (e.g.,
integration, aid
effectiveness).

Multiple monitoring
systems contradicted
integrating HIS under
SWAps.

Centralized HIS
undermined local
health managers’ use
of information.

Actors’ Adherence to the Interests and Values Underlying Frames and its
Influence on IS Innovation in Healthcare

In this section, we discuss how the set of interests and values on which actors constructed frames influenced
what rhetorical strategy they chose and those choices’ consequences on IS innovation. In particular, we base
the discussion that follows on two main examples: 1) WHO, a weak actor that tried to limit the hegemony of a
dominant frame; and 2) the national HIV/AIDS program’s information officers, also weak actors but who differed
from WHO in that their rhetorical strategy supported the dominant frame of accountability.
Starting with the first example, as the second and third phase of the case study (see summary in Tables 4
and 5) show, the WHO adopted a rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences to integrate some of SPHC
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frames into its policy. By doing so, the WHO reconfigured its interests and values. On the one hand, the
WHO accepted the managerialist principles of result-based management that characterized SPHC: it
included monitoring indicators into its “Health for All Strategy” and it actively supported the HIV/AIDS
epidemiological and surveillance systems, including the computerized epidemiological information system
(CEIS) of the national immunization program in Kenya. It intended these initiatives to strengthen health
sector planning and management systems. On the other hand, the WHO maintained core principles and
values that underlay key PHC frames. For example, in the “Health for All Strategy”, the WHO complied with
the community healthcare principle of PHC by envisaging that policymakers should design monitoring
indicators that were “meaningful” to local populations. Likewise, its policy of integrating health interventions
into national and rural health systems was consistent with PHC’s comprehensive healthcare values. Thus,
the WHO adhered to some SPHC principles while demonstrating coherence with core PHC values.
As the WHO example shows, adhering to the principles that underlie frames in a rhetorical strategy is
particularly important when a weak policy actor seeks to compromise between dominant and competing
frames. By adopting a rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences, the WHO successfully limited the
hegemony of the dominant frame of SPHC while translating some of PHC frames into action. It reduced IS
innovation contradictions by integrating donor-driven reporting systems under the umbrella of overarching
health programs. On the other hand, unresolved contradictions included overburdening health workers
with collecting health data for each national health program.
Thus, the frames and rhetorical strategies that actors adopt reflect how they reconfigure their interests and
values (Pope et al., 2006). Similarly, by becoming more accountable to their donors, the national HIV/AIDS
program’s information officers assimilated dominant frames that legitimized accountability through a
rhetorical strategy of normalization (see phase 5, which Table 7 summarizes). The rhetorical strategy of
normalization represented these information officers’ remissively accepting accountability to preserve access
to donor funding and, therefore, protect their interests. The program’s information officers adhered strongly
to the interests that underlay dominant frames of accountability. Thus, these officers contributed to limiting
the effectiveness of competing frames that supported aid effectiveness and integrating health information
systems. The example of these officers assimilating the dominant frames of accountability shows that
dominant frames of international policies can intensify and extend their influence thanks to the support of
local actors. Hence, national programs that normalized accountability contributed to the strong centralization
of these programs’ health information systems. HIS centralization contradicted the need for local health
managers to use information, which undermined health service management and delivery.
Past research has acknowledged that donor agencies’ accountability interests are among the major sources
of fragmented HIS in developing countries (Madon et al., 2010; Sahay, Saebo, Mekonnen, & Gizaw, 2010;
Smith et al., 2008). Our findings suggest that one cannot simply associate contradictory outcomes of IS
innovation with powerful actors who seek to establish the hegemony of dominant frames. Frames inherent in
the rhetorical strategies of less powerful policy actors also matter and may have further controversial effects.
In particular, the two examples above illustrate that the effect of rhetorical strategies depend on whether
authors adhere to the interests and values on which frames are constructed.
In Section 5.2, we illustrate the opposite case of two policy actors, one less powerful than the other. These
two actors did not successfully use their rhetorical strategies to affirm a new policy because they did not
strongly adhere to the interests and values that underlay the frames carried in their rhetorical strategies.
We also discuss the impact of these rhetorical strategies on IS innovation contradictions.

5.2

The Ambiguous Political Function of Frames in Policy Transformation and IS
Innovation

In this section, we discuss how actors can use frames that apparently support a system of common values
to deliver different rhetorical strategies and, therefore, produce different effects in IS innovation. For
example, as narrated in the fourth phase of the case study (see summary in Table 6), Kenya’s Ministry of
Health enacted a rhetorical strategy of resolving differences to integrate health information systems.
Together with sector-wide approaches (SWAps), it intended its new policy for integrating HIS to reverse
the fragmentation trend that SPHC set. In particular, it stressed the importance of integrating HIS for
better heath sector planning, performance monitoring, and accountability. On the other hand, donor
agencies considered poor accountability as a legitimate reason for limiting budget support envisaged in
sector-wide approaches. Donor agencies defended the principle of accountability through a polemic
rhetorical strategy. By doing so, they neutralized SWAps’ effect and, in particular, aid effectiveness. Most
of all, they challenged the integration of health programs and information systems.
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Whereas the Ministry of Health used the lack of accountability as a rhetorical device to formulate and
legitimize integration policies, donor agencies used the lack of accountability as a rhetorical device to
delegitimize such policies and limit integration where possible. Accountability assumed different
legitimation roles according to the different meanings that various actors gave it in practice. Kenya’s
Ministry of Health legitimized accountability in its rhetorical strategy but not so much in practice. As we
point out in Section 4.4, the ministry’s lack of capacity and effort in setting up financial control systems
demonstrated its poor legitimacy of accountability. However, for donor agencies, accountability was an
important institutional requirement to safeguard their interests. Thus, as some donor agencies perceived
little commitment to accountability from the ministry’s side, they were reluctant to provide budget support
and sponsor the integration of health interventions and information systems under the new policies (e.g.,
national health policy and SWAps).
Based on these findings, we can conclude that the Ministry of Health did not fully adhere to the
accountability principles and practices that underlay the frames of its new policy. As a result, the new
integration policy did not successfully diminish the effects of donors’ dominant frames. Hence, initial
attempts to integrate the HIS, which included integrating data-collection forms, contradicted donors’
continuous support to vertical HIS.
Another example of misalignment with the values that underlay a frame concerns the World Bank’s role in
supporting SWAps and, later, HIV/AIDS multisectoral policies. The World Bank actively contributed to
shaping both policies on the principle of aid effectiveness. Yet, multisectoral policies contradicted SWAps
and diminished their effects, which undermined efforts for integrated HIS. One can explain the
contradictions between these two policies by analyzing the interests that drove the World Bank’s rhetorical
strategies. As Table 6 summarizes, the World Bank used aid effectiveness as a rhetorical device to
defend its lending policies and practices and revert the fragmentation of health programs. It drew on the
same principle of aid effectiveness to construct the frame that legitimized multisectoral coordination in
HIV/AIDS. Yet, in this case, the World Bank used the principle of aid effectiveness as part of a rhetorical
strategy to legitimize its power and control over HIV/AIDS interventions, an area that had begun to attract
much political and economic interest (see phase 5 summarized in Table 7). Thus, the rhetorical strategy of
the World Bank supported a new frame of multisectoral coordination that contradicted SWAps’ frame of
sector-wide integration. Hence, two frames that appeared to build on the same principle (“aid
effectiveness”) in reality preserved different political interests. One can see this rhetorical strategy’s failure
in NACC’s creating multiple monitoring systems, which contradicted integrating health interventions and
information systems under SWAps.
Previous studies have found how rhetorical strategies may influence the legitimacy of IS innovations and
how user communities adopt and diffuse such strategies (Barrett et al., 2013; Kaganer, Pawlowski, & WileyPatton, 2010). Our findings add to these studies by demonstrating that one needs to understand a rhetorical
strategy’s effectiveness not only in relation to its recipients but also in relation to its authors. In addition to
what previous studies have suggested (Barrett et al., 2013), we found that actors may not always act
coherently with the interests and values that underlie the frames inherent in their own rhetorical strategies.
This finding extends existing studies (Constantinides & Barrett, 2014) by explaining why actors can use
similar frames in different rhetorical strategies to legitimize different roles of IS innovation in the health
sector. Moreover, we further extend previous studies by demonstrating that ambiguity in policy does not only
depend on incongruent frames that reflect a misalignment of interests and values among various actors
(Pope et al., 2006). By constructing frames onto principles that do not fully align with its particular interests or
values, a policy actor may generate policy and IS innovation contradictions. Indeed, one can see as much in
the World Bank’s constructing multisectoral policies and SWAps frames on the same principles. Yet, it
sought to achieve misaligned interests, which resulted in one policy damaging the other.
These findings unveil the complexity of the economic and political dimensions of discourse and their
influence on IS innovations (Barrett et al., 2013). In particular, they shift attention to the ambiguous
political function of frames by disconnecting the discursive justification for change and innovation from the
interests that motivate them.

5.3

The Role of Technology in the Context of Rhetorical Strategies

In Section 5.2, we illustrate how frames can influence the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in relation
to their alignment with actors’ interests and values. In this section, we discuss technology’s role in shaping
frames to better understand its influence on policy enactments.
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Previous research has acknowledged IS innovations’ role in influencing policymaking in the health sector
(Klecun, 2015; Mathar, 2011). Yet, existing studies do not explicitly show how a technology’s material
features influence policy transformation (Constantinides, 2013; Doolin, 2003; Klecun, 2011; Raviola &
Norbäck, 2013). In the discussion that follows, we demonstrate how our study fills this gap. In particular,
we argue that policy actors draw on technology to construct frames, which they then diffuse through
rhetorical strategies. In this way, technology contributes to policy transformation. We also argue that
technology’s resulting effects on IS innovation contradictions are linked to how actors relate their values
and interests with the frames technology shapes and the consequent rhetorical strategies that they enact.
In this study, we consider HIS as comprising such material components as monitoring indicators and
systems, data reports, health information, and so on. For example, as we discuss in Section 4.2,
monitoring indicators helped to demonstrate how selective interventions can be easy to measure and able
to produce rapid results—one of the key frames of SPHC.
WHO also integrated monitoring indicators and the SPHC frames that they represented in the rhetorical strategy
(i.e., bracketing differences) that it enacted to create commonalities between PHC and SPHC. In particular, as we
can see in phase 3, monitoring tools, such as epidemiological and surveillance systems, helped to shape the
SPHC frames that legitimized the use of managerial data to measure program performance.
The fourth phase of the case study (see summary in Table 6) shows how technology constraints
contributed to making the Ministry of Health realize that it needed to integrate HIS for performance
monitoring and accountability, which represented a key frame of its new policy. Likewise, in the last phase
of the case study (see summary in Table 7), we show how the national HIV/AIDS program’s information
officers drew on data reports that “documented” results to demonstrate how field workers should use the
HIS to account for results. In this way, they gave continuity to the frame of accountability and legitimized
centralized reporting systems while undermining the local health managers’ use of information.
These examples demonstrate how technology influences how actors construct frames and, thereby,
mediates rhetorical strategies. Dominant frames of accountability legitimized technology as enabling health
sector policies (Klecun, 2015) such as performance monitoring. Fundamental material components of
Kenya’s HIS, such as monitoring indicators and data reports, contributed to shaping frames that legitimized
performance monitoring and accountability in health sector management. While policy actors diffused such
frames through rhetorical strategies, HIS influenced policy transformations and IS innovation in healthcare.
As we discuss in Section 5.2, frames that legitimized accountability became part of different rhetorical
strategies to shape different visions of how health information systems should work to support Kenya’s
health sector’s performance and how various actors monitored it. Actors debated whether Kenya needed
to integrate its HIS under a health sector performance-monitoring framework as SWAps advocated or
whether each national program needed its own IS to account for quick results and donor funding as
spelled out in the SPHC policy. These considerations highlight the importance of how actors relate their
values and interests to the frames that a technology shapes. In this way, one can better understand how
technology mediates a rhetorical strategy and its influence on IS innovation.
In addition, the persistence of technology-shaped frames may lead to little changes to actors’ vision of
how technology can innovate the health sector. For example, as our case study shows the HIS gave
continuity to the hegemonic frame of accountability that legitimized the centralized reporting of health data
to account for results. As a result, local health managers’ poor usage of information in the provision of
health services contradicted the HIS function that advocated for supporting health service planning and
management at the local level.
We acknowledge the role of existing technologies in performing future innovations (Raviola & Norbäck,
2013). We add that, by contributing to shaping dominant frames, existing technologies can constrain
policy change and the development of new IS innovations that may come with it. This point is particularly
important because we believe that existing research (Klecun, 2015) explains little about how competing
frames can challenge dominant frames that technologies shape and, thereby, influence technological
change and IS innovation. With the introduction of new innovative technologies, new frames should come
into existence and be diffused to trigger wider policy change.
In summary, our findings provide insights into the influence of frames and rhetorical strategies on IS
innovation and the role that different actors play in enacting policies that affect IS innovation. We also
increase the understanding of the role that technology plays in enacting policies that affect IS innovation
Figure 2 clearly represents our theoretical contribution. In the figure, dominant and competing frames
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carried in rhetorical strategies stand in a mutual shaping relationship with technology. Policy actors’
adherence to the interests and values represented in such frames may influence the effectiveness of
rhetorical strategies and how actors enact policies that affect IS innovation.
Even though our case study evidences the sets of relationships we portray in Figure 2, we recognize the
limitations of generalizing them to other settings. However, our representation below demonstrates how
using frame theory in rhetorical strategy analysis can deepen our understanding of the implications of
policy transformation for healthcare IS innovation.

Figure 2. Frames, Rhetorical Strategies, and Technology Relationships in Policy
Transformation and Healthcare IS Innovation

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we systematically explain the mechanisms through which policy creation and enactment
affect IS innovation in the health sector. We adopt frame theory and rhetorical strategies analysis to better
understand the effectiveness of rhetorical strategies in challenging dominant frames and the resultant
implications for policy and IS innovation. Thus, we extend the application of discourse analysis methods in
IS research (Wagner, 2003; Webb & Mallon, 2007) and existing discursive approaches to IS innovation
(Barrett et al., 2013; Constantinides, 2013; Constantinides & Barrett, 2014).
By focusing on frames, we demonstrate how actors exercise the “insidious” political influence (Jones &
Exworthy, 2015) of rhetorical strategies on IS innovation by disconnecting the discursive justification for an
innovation from the interests that motivate it. Thus, the way an IS innovation unfolds and produces its
effects is only in part driven by dominant frames (Barrett et al., 2013) and the popularity of innovation
concepts (Wang 2009). The power-balance between actors and how actors relate their interests and
values with frames are two important factors that determine which rhetorical strategies actors use and
these strategies’ role in diffusing and establishing frames that influence IS innovations.
We also contribute to better understanding the role of information technology in shaping policy and IS
innovation. In particular, we highlight the role of technology in shaping dominant frames. We need to know
the way in which actors relate their interests and values with technology-shaped frames to understand the
implications of technology for policy transformation and healthcare IS innovation. We also demonstrate
the implications of a technology’s materiality in giving continuity to a dominant frame, which limits policy
change and further IS innovation.
We acknowledge the limitations of focusing on one type of technology such as health information systems
in a specific context such as Kenya. Such limitations concern the implications of our findings for
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understanding the role of other types of technology in shaping health sector policies in other contexts.
This fact notwithstanding, we demonstrate how one can use rhetorical strategy analysis to better
understand the implications of policy transformation for IS innovation.
Our theoretical contribution (see Figure 2) and the methodological approach that we develop in this paper
could serve as a basis for future research to further our understanding of how different types of technology
(e.g., electronic health records systems, telehealth, mobile health, etc.) shape policy and lead to new
trajectories of action in IS innovation. Past research has found how IT concepts that drive the diffusion of
IS innovations become taken for granted and acquire legitimacy (Wang, 2009). But we also need to
understand how IT concepts translate into policy that influences IS innovations and their
institutionalization at a large scale. The applicability of a discursive approach to analyzing how technology
performs policy is not restricted to IT-enabled transformation in healthcare and the wider public sector. A
rhetorical strategy analysis could benefit research that focuses on how technology standards (Backhouse,
Hsu, & Silva, 2006) are developed and shape technology and innovation policies.
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Appendix
Table A1. Phase 1: Rhetorical Strategies and Frames Shaping PHC in International Health (1970-1978)
Actor: World Health Organization
Rhetorical strategy
Polemic rhetorical strategy to legitimize the strengthening of health infrastructures through PHC.
Frames
Vertical control programs, such as malaria eradication, cannot deliver desired results.
“During the 1960s, malaria eradication was facing serious difficulties in the field; ultimately, it would suffer colossal
and embarrassing failures. In 1969, the World Health Assembly, declaring that it was not feasible to eradicate malaria
in many parts of the world, …emphasized the need to develop rural health systems and to integrate malaria control
into general health services” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 65).
Integrating healthcare in community-based services.
“[PHC] is the first level of contact of individuals, the family and community with the national health system bringing
health care as close as possible to where people live and work, and constitutes the first element of a continuing health
care process” (emphasis added) (World Health Organization, 1978).
Health is “a fundamental human right” and a matter of “social justice”.
“The [Alma-Ata] Conference strongly reaffirms that health…is a fundamental human right” (emphasis added) (World
Health Organization, 1978).
“A main social target…should be the attainment by all peoples of the world by the year 2000 of a level of health that
will permit them to lead a socially and economically productive life. Primary health care is the key to attaining this
target as part of development in the spirit of social justice” (emphasis added) (World Health Organization, 1978).
PHC promotes “equity of distribution of healthcare”.
“Equity of distribution of health care has now become the yardstick by which nations will be measured. Primary Health
Care has become a recognized field” (emphasis added) (Bennett, 1979, p. 505).
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Table A2. Phase 2: The Creation of SPHC as a Substitute of PHC in International Health (1979-1980)
Actors: World Bank and other international agencies
Rhetorical strategy
Polemic rhetorical strategy to delegitimize PHC and legitimize SPHC.
Frames
PHC is unrealistic and unattainable.
“A number of governments, agencies, and individuals saw WHO’s idealistic view of Primary Health Care as
“unrealistic” and unattainable” (Brown et al., 2006, p. 67).
Vertical health programs (“disease control programs”) can deliver “cost-effectiveness” and rapid “tangible results”.
“The selective approach to controlling endemic disease in the developing countries is potentially the most costeffective type of medical intervention” (emphasis added) (Walsh & Warren, 1979, p. 972).
“Despite the universal rhetorical support being given to the idea of PHC…, many governments and agencies remain
tied to more traditional views of the causes of disease and the best ways of organizing scarce resources within
disease control programs (emphasis added) (Gish, 1982, p. 1050).
“It is regrettable that afterward the impatience of some international agencies, both UN and private, and their
emphasis on achieving tangible results instead of promoting change…led to major distortions of the original concept
of primary health care” (emphasis added) (Tejada de Rivero 2003, p. 4).
Rhetorical strategy
Normalization rhetorical strategy to suppress differences between comprehensive and selective care and replace
PHC with SPHC.
Frames
Cannot sustain “comprehensive” PHC with few available resources.
“Since it must be acknowledged that resources available for health programs are usually limited, the provision of total
primary health care to everyone in the near future remains unlikely… services targeted to the few most important
diseases may be the most effective means of improving the health of the greatest number of people” (Walsh &
Warren, 1980, p. 148).
SPHC is the only possible solution.
“Until comprehensive primary health care can be made available to all, services targeted to the few most important
diseases may be the most effective means of improving the health of the greatest number of people” (emphasis
added) (Walsh & Warren, 1979, p. 973).
Technology
Monitoring indicators help to demonstrate how “selective interventions can be easy to measure and able to produce
rapid results” (an SPHC frame).
“[GOBI] appeared easy to monitor and evaluate. Moreover, [its interventions] were measurable and had clear targets.
Funding appeared easier to obtain because indicators of success and reporting could be produced more rapidly”
(Cueto, 2004, p. 1869).
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Table A2. Phase 2: The Creation of SPHC as a Substitute of PHC in International Health (1978-1980)
Actor: World Health Organization
Rhetorical strategy
Rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences to review PHC and create commonalities with SPHC.
Frames
Indicators should be used to monitor the “Health for All” strategy
“It is expected…that agreement on acceptable indicators for assessing progress towards health for all will gradually
be evolved” (emphasis added) (World Health Organization, 1979, p. 8).
Monitoring indicators should be “manageable” and “meaningful” for local populations.
“High selectivity has to be employed so that the use of indicators becomes manageable and meaningful” (emphasis
added) (WHO 1979, p. 30).
One should use “sampling” to avoid “overloading health workers with routine data collection”, “inaccurate reporting
and unused information.”
“Sampling…has the advantage of avoiding overloading health workers with routine data collection, which often leads
to inaccurate reporting and unused information” (emphasis added) (World Health Organization 1979, p. 32).
Technology
Monitoring indicators help to demonstrate how one can use measurable targets to gauge health interventions
progress as spelled out in the SPHC policy.
“It is important to attempt to specify, national, regional and global targets such as those adopted by the WHA when it
resolved to provide by 1990 immunization for all the children of the world…” (emphasis added) (World Health
Organization, 1979, p. 8).
“It is important that [governments] introduce…a process of evaluation. This will include the assessment of the
effectiveness and impact of the measures they are taking and the monitoring of the progress and efficiency with which
these measures are being carried out” (emphasis added) (World Health Organization, 1979, p. 30).

Table A3. Phase 3: Contestation between SPHC and PHC in Kenya (1980-1994)
Actor: World Health Organization
Rhetorical strategies
Rhetorical strategy of bracketing differences to appropriate elements of SPHC while keeping some of the principles of
PHC.
Frames
Integrate health interventions into national programs and rural systems based on PHC principles.
“The Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) Control Program will not be a vertical program but will be decentralized and
integrated with other programs based on…PHC principles…” (emphasis added) (NASCOP, 1990).
“Generate managerial data to measure…program performance and results”.
(see quote under “Technology” below)
Technology
Epidemiological and surveillance systems constitute the SPHC’s frame that legitimizes the production of managerial
data to measure program performance.
“Epidemiology and surveillance will…generate managerial data to measure…program performance and results”
(NASCOP, 1990).
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Table A4. Phase 4: National Policy of Integrating HIS and Translating International SWAps into Kenya (19942000)
Actor: Kenya’s Ministry of Health
Rhetorical strategy
Rhetorical strategy of resolving differences to integrate and strengthen HIS in support of “disease surveillance,
planning, monitoring and evaluation” (Ministry of Health, 1994, p. 47).
Frames
Integrating HIS can improve performance monitoring and accountability.
“[The HIS is] characterized by a lack of integration…with no effective central coordination to ensure that information…
is readily available to all who need it” (emphasis added) (Ministry of Health, 1994, p. 5).
“There will be strengthening of the existing health and management information systems…for improved financial
accountability, personnel management and performance monitoring. This will be accorded a very high priority”
(emphasis added) (Ministry of Health, 1996, p. viii).
“[Monitoring and evaluation] will be supported by the use of explicit indicators and enhanced health management
information systems, particularly those pertaining to financial accountability” (emphasis added) (Ministry of Health,
1996, p. viii).
Technology
Technology constraints of fragmented HIS contribute to the realization that accounting for results cannot work without
integration, which leads to creating a new frame that legitimizes efforts to integrate HIS for better performance
monitoring and accountability.
“HIS does not get reports on immunization during some months…. The central processing of immunization data
should be done solely at HIS…. Data on immunization should be sent to HIS for analysis” (HIS, 1991).
“The chairman [the Deputy Chief Economist of the Department of Planning] reiterated the need for accurate and
timely information…for decision making and proper planning…. He reportedly accused the staff of the HIS’s low level
of performance” (HIS, 2000a).
“Harmonization of health data was important for taking action… the information needed by health planners and health
managers should be amalgamated… vertical programs have to be integrated with HIS” (HIS, 2000b).
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Table A4. Phase 4: National Policy of Integrating HIS and Translating International SWAps into Kenya (19942000)
Actors: World Bank and international community
Rhetorical strategy
Rhetorical strategy of resolving differences to overcome the limitations of donor-driven fragmentation of vertical
programs.
“In January 1997, the Danish Government and the World Bank hosted an informal meeting of bilateral and multilateral
agencies concerned with sector-wide approaches to health development…. To achieve sustained improvements in
people's health, it was agreed that sector-wide approaches offer a better prospect than the piecemeal pursuit of
separately financed projects” (emphasis added) (Cassel, 1997, p.1).
“Donor concerns about aid effectiveness are matched by government frustrations with the fragmentation and
managerial overload caused by disparate projects. For both parties there is an interest in moving towards broadbased partnerships….” (Emphasis added) (Cassel, 1997, p. 7).
Frames
Integrate health sector interventions through budget support to achieve aid-effectiveness.
“The aim [of SWAps is] to gradually increase the proportion of expenditure channeled through the government budget,
and to decrease reliance on separate projects funded by individual agencies” (Cassel, 1997, p.12).
“[One of the main factors] influencing the development of the [SWAps] concept by the World Bank […] was
consideration of the far-reaching criticisms of the Bank’s project lending policies and practices” (World Bank, 1992, as
cited in Jones, 2000, p. 4).
“[SWAps is an instrument] that the World Bank has taken the lead in promoting as a way of increasing aid
effectiveness, especially in Africa” (emphasis added) (Jones, 2000, p. 1).
Central monitoring systems are fundamental to track funding and results.
“In moving from projects toward a sector-wide approach the aim is not just to harmonize donor procedures, but for
donors to use national systems for monitoring performance, financial management and procurement of goods and
services. …To ensure financial accountability, the key challenge is to develop national management systems, which
link the use of funds with measures of performance” (emphasis added) (Cassel, 1997, p. xvii).
Interview: “We clearly defined a monitoring framework…and that plan is being implemented under the strategy of
SWAps.”
Interview: “M&E unit has been set up to monitor the sector wide approach”.
Actors: major donor agencies
Rhetorical strategy
Polemic rhetorical strategy to protect donor interests from lack of financial capacity and accountability of national
governments.
Frames
Sound program management, monitoring capacity, and accountability are essential to qualify for budget support.
“Most technical agencies, development banks and bilaterals support the idea of sector-wide approaches in principle.
Issues which will influence whether principle translates into practice include: concerns about accountability and the
political risks of being associated with corrupt or unproductive spending” (Cassel, 1997, p. xiv).
“A number of international standards have been defined which could form the basis of an agreed minimum standard
of financial management capacity to allow most donors to participate in common arrangements” (Cassel, 1997, p. 45).
For those agencies that are not in a position to channel all or part of their funds through national systems, project
funding remains a second-best, and ideally temporary, alternative” (Cassel, 1997, p. 56).
Interview: “The decision in Kenya has always been that their financial systems are not robust enough, so we do not
put budget support money through Kenya”.
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Table A5. Phase 5: Incongruent Frames of Integration in Kenya (2000-2011)
Actors: World Bank and international community
Rhetorical strategies
Rhetorical strategy of resolving differences to reduce fragmentation of HIV/AIDS interventions and increase aideffectiveness.
Frames
Multisectoral coordination of HIV/AIDS interventions and integrated M&E to achieve aid-effectiveness
Interview: “When I started working in Kenya [in 1999]…, the Government, [the HIV/AIDS program], and all the
donors…offered a strategy…to work jointly on monitoring and evaluation because every one was monitoring and
evaluating their own project with their own finance”.
“[NACC’s mission] include coordinate and supervise implementation of AIDS programs through a multisectoral,
multidisciplinary approach…, mobilize Government ministries and institutions, NGOs etc. to participate in AIDS
control…, [and] develop management information systems for AIDS control” (Government of Kenya, 1997).
“The [Kenya National Strategic Plan] has been jointly designed to respond directly to the five Paris Principles for Aid
Effectiveness, namely: (i) ownership; (ii) harmonization among all partners; (iii) alignment with national strategic
planning processes; (iv) a focus on results; and, (v) mutual accountability. This strategy aims to build upon and
deepen NACCs achievements…in the coordination of stakeholders working on HIV in Kenya nationally, including
development partners and Government ministries, departments and agencies” (NACC, 2009, pp. xi, 14).
Actors: Kenya’s national HIV/AIDS program’s information officers
Rhetorical strategy
Rhetorical strategy of normalization to enforce accountability on health workers collecting data at health facilities.
Frames
“Documenting” drugs consumption is vital to access funding.
Interview: “We need to keep [donors] abreast of what is happening [to solicit] further funding. So… we have to work
extra hard to ensure that we have information at our fingertips”.
Technology
Information officers draw upon HIS outputs, such as data reports “documenting” results, in their rhetorical strategy to
demonstrate how field workers should use the HIS to account for results and give continuity to the frame of
accountability.
Interview: “Issues of documentation have been problems among health workers… [We tell] them: ‘I wouldn’t give you
drugs before you tell me what you spent on drugs… [You can use reported data to]… replenish whatever stock you
need”.
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